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Carla Zavala Comment
Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide Manslaughter?
Carla Zavala*
I. Introduction
On the morning of July 13, 2014, police found an eighteen-year-old dead in his pick-up
truck behind a K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts. 1 It was Conrad Roy, whose mother had
reported him missing after he failed to come home the night before.2 He left his mother’s house
the previous night, around 6:30 PM, telling her that he would be visiting a friend. 3 Instead, the
young man drove to the Fairhaven K-Mart and filled the passenger cabin of his truck with carbon
monoxide using a combustion engine.4 By the time the police found Conrad the next morning, he
was dead.5 According to the district attorney’s office, police searched Conrad’s cell phone in the
course of their investigation and found that he had been text-messaging Michelle Carter at the time
of his death.6
At the time of Conrad’s suicide, Michelle Carter was a seventeen-year-old high school
student.

She met Conrad in 2012 while both were visiting relatives in the same Florida

neighborhood.7 The two initiated a romantic relationship that was primarily carried on through
online and cell phone communication, with very little in-person contact. 8 Initially, Michelle

*

J.D. Candidate 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law.
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17, Commonwealth v. Carter, No.
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See Stephanie Slifer, Is It a Crime to “Encourage Suicide”? Teens’ Texts Under Scrutiny, CBS NEWS, Mar. 3,
2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-crime-to-encourage-suicide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-royand-michelle-carter/.
6
See Investigators Say Plainville Girl ‘Strongly Influenced’ Teen’s Suicide, CBS BOS., Feb. 27, 2015,
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/02/27/investigators-say-plainville-girl-strongly-influenced-teens-suicide/.
7
See Astead W. Henderdon & John R. Ellement, Judge Won’t Dismiss Case Against Teen Who Urged Friend’s
Suicide, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/09/23/judge-refuses-dismisscharge-plainville-teen-suicide/F6IlTaXG7L6X0MJTQAYuyK/story.html.
8
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1.
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admitted to police that she was talking to Conrad at the time he committed suicide but claimed she
did not know what he was doing.9 She said that when the phone call ended, she “did not think
much of it.”10 Police were able to recover conversations between the two from Conrad’s cell
phone, despite Michelle having asked Conrad to delete them.11 Conrad’s text messages revealed
a very different picture. For at least a week prior to his suicide, Conrad spoke to Michelle about
his plans to commit suicide.12 Michelle’s own text messages with a friend revealed that she had a
forty-seven minute telephone conversation with Conrad on the night he committed suicide.13
On February 5, 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle on charges of involuntary
manslaughter for Conrad’s suicide.14 According to prosecutors, Michelle “pressured [Conrad] to
go through with suicide for almost a week before he carried out the act . . . counseled him to
overcome his fears; researched methods of committing suicide painlessly; and lied to police, his
family and her friends about his whereabouts during the act itself and after.”15 The district attorney
believed Michelle’s involvement “caused Conrad’s death by wantonly and recklessly assisting him
in poisoning himself with carbon monoxide.”16 Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders agreed and
rejected Michelle’s motion to dismiss on September 23, 2015, allowing the prosecution to proceed
with the charges against her.17

See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 18.
Id.
11
Abby Phillip, “It’s Now or Never”: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST,
Aug. 31, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-never-texts-revealteens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/.
12
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1.
13
See id. at 21; see also Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
14
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1; Slifer, supra note 5.
15
Phillip, supra note 11.
16
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 24.
17
See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
9
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Suicide is a significant problem in the United States.18 Suicide is the tenth leading cause
of death for people of all ages in the United States.19 For Americans between ages fifteen and
twenty-four, the reality is still harsher: suicide is the second leading cause of death in this age
group.20 High school students seem especially vulnerable to attempting suicide.21 This means that
it is likely that most teenagers and young adults know someone who has had suicidal thoughts or
has attempted suicide. What if, instead of supporting their depressed peers or encouraging them
to seek psychiatric help, people began supporting their plans to commit suicide and pressuring
them to kill themselves? This could be why the public has found Michelle’s actions so appalling.
Even a cursory glance at the comments on any news article about Michelle’s case will show
that many people agree with the prosecution’s decision to charge Michelle. Certainly, her actions
were not those of a model friend, girlfriend, or citizen. Martin W. Healy, chief legal counsel at
the Massachusetts Bar Association, commented to the Boston Globe that Michelle’s lawyers “do
not have a particularly sympathetic defendant.”22 But are her actions so blameworthy that she
should spend twenty years in state prison?23 Not all actions that insult society’s conception of
moral conduct give rise to criminal liability.

18

According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over the past decade, suicide has increased
from a low of 10.4 per 100,000 people in 2000 to 12.1 per 100,000 people in 2013, the most recent year for which
data is available. See Suicide Facts, SUICIDE AWARENESS VOICES OF EDUCATION,
http://www.save.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.viewPage&page_id=705D5DF4-055B-F1EC3F66462866FCB4E6 (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
19
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2013-a.pdf.
20
See id.
21
In 2013, eight percent of students in high school attempted suicide, compared to 0.6% of adults over eighteen
years old. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See Suicide Facts at a Glance, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf.
22
Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
23
In Massachusetts, manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in state prison. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015).
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Part II of this Comment will discuss the particular circumstances of Conrad Roy’s suicide
and Michelle Carter’s role in it, which gave rise to her indictment for involuntary manslaughter.
Part III of this Comment will analyze the history of how various states have treated actions like
Michelle’s. Part IV will separate the types of conduct into three categories by the defendant’s
level of participation in the other person’s suicide. Part V will argue that a statute that specifically
proscribes the encouragement of suicide would be better suited to achieve the societal goals
punishment is intended to serve and would be a better alternative for prosecuting Michelle and
others like her. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. The Case Against Michelle Carter
Michelle Carter is accused of encouraging her boyfriend, Conrad Roy, to commit suicide,
which he eventually did. This section will address the specifics of Michelle’s involvement in
Conrad’s suicide. Then, it will discuss the arguments raised by the prosecution in its charges
against Michelle. Lastly, it will delineate the arguments raised by Michelle in her defense.
A. Michelle Carter’s Role in Conrad Roy’s Suicide
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy met in 2012, when both teens were visiting relatives who
lived in Florida.24 Afterwards, they developed a romantic relationship. Although they both lived
in Massachusetts, their relationship was mostly online.25 Conrad had a history of. According to
his family, Conrad had been struggling with suicidal thoughts and depression these issues for
several years.26 Conrad had attempted suicide in 2012 by ingesting acetaminophen and was treated
with medication, counseling, and hospitalizations at psychiatric facilities.

27

Conrad’s

24

See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1. Some sources have
reported that the two teens actually met on the internet prior to meeting in person. See Phillip, supra note 11.
26
See CBS BOS., supra note 6.
27
See Laura Crimaldi, “It’s Now or Never,” Text Said to Friend Allegedly Urged to Kill Self, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 26,
2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/25/you-have-just-tonightnight/jTor3lbphOrwZM9KNEPOLJ/story.html.
25
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grandmother, however, claimed that Conrad seemed to be “pulling out of [the depression].”28 Text
messages between Michelle and Conrad show the couple discussed suicide often and in great detail
over the course of their relationship.29 She told him he was strong enough to do it, and that his
parents would understand that he had reached a point where no one could save him.30
Over time, Michelle became even more involved in Conrad’s suicide plans.

She

encouraged him to overcome his fear of death or failing in his suicide attempt. 31 In one text
exchange, she told him that once he committed suicide, he would finally “get to be happy in
heaven. No more pain. No more bad thoughts and worries. [He would] be free.”32 Michelle even
conducted research and recommended methods of suicide. 33

On one occasion, Michelle

specifically suggested that Conrad kill himself by carbon monoxide poisoning, which would be
“painless” and “would definitely work.”34 When Conrad failed to carry out the plans, Michelle
expressed her frustration to him: “I guess that [I am frustrated], just because you always say you
are going to do it but you don’t, but last night I know you really wanted to do it and I’m not mad.
Well I mean kind of, I guess.”35 Michelle complained to him that he always had an excuse for not
committing suicide.36
On July 6, 2014, six days before Conrad committed suicide, Conrad and Michelle discussed
the logistics of his suicide plans.37 Michelle told him that with carbon monoxide poisoning he
would “lose consciousness with no pain. [He would] just fall asleep and die.”38 On July 9, Conrad

28

See CBS BOS., supra note 6.
See Phillip, supra note 11.
30
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 2.
31
See id. at 3.
32
Id.
33
See Phillip, supra note 11.
34
See id.
35
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 4.
36
See id. at 4–5.
37
See id. at 6.
38
See id.
29
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realized his father’s generator, which he was going to use to produce carbon monoxide, did not
work.39 In the days that followed, Michelle and Conrad worked on finding another method to
produce carbon monoxide and ensured that Conrad’s parents did not find out about the plan.40
On July 12, 2014, Michelle and Conrad began their conversation at 4:19 AM, when
Michelle suggested that “[i]t’s probably the best time now because everyone is sleeping.” 41
Throughout the day, Michelle asked him if he was going to do it that night, and told him repeatedly
that he was overthinking and needed to “just do it.”42 Conrad sent his last text message at 6:25 PM
that evening, when he left his mother’s house for the K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts. 43
Conrad’s phone records show two forty-minute phone calls with Michelle that evening.44 During
the second phone call, Conrad exited the car and told Michelle that he was afraid the carbon
monoxide poisoning was working; she told him to “get back in.”45 The next morning, police found
Conrad’s car in the parking lot, after his mother reported him missing.46 Conrad Roy was dead.
In the days that followed, Michelle told Conrad’s mother and sister, her own friend
Samantha, and the police that she did not know that Conrad planned to commit suicide.47 The
police searched Michelle’s phone and noted that she had deleted her conversation with Conrad
after 7:00 PM on the evening he committed suicide.48 When she heard that police were looking
into Conrad’s text messages as part of his suicide investigation, Michelle texted her friend

39

See id. at 8.
See id. at 9–10.
41
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 11.
42
See id. at 12–16.
43
See id. at 16.
44
See id. at 17.
45
See id. The police found this information in Michelle’s text messages to her friend Samantha Boardman on
September 15. See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 21 (“I was the
one on the phone with him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I fucken [sic]
told him to get back in, Sam, because I knew he would do it all over again the next day and I couldn’t have him live
the way he was living anymore.”).
46
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 17.
47
See id. at 17–18.
48
See id. at 18.
40

7

Carla Zavala Comment
Samantha in a panic, claiming that if police were to read her messages to Conrad, she would be
“done,” his family would hate her, and she could go to jail.49 In September, Michelle began telling
Samantha that Conrad’s death was her fault because she could have stopped him but that Samantha
would not understand because she had “never helped someone with a suicide.”50
B. District Attorney’s Case
In February 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle Carter, now eighteen years old, for
involuntary manslaughter. 51 The manslaughter statute in Massachusetts does not contain a
definition for “manslaughter;” instead, its meaning is derived from the common law definition.52
Common law defines involuntary manslaughter as “an unlawful homicide unintentionally caused
by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.”53 According to the State, Michelle’s actions were both
objectively and subjectively reckless.54 Michelle was objectively wanton or reckless because “any
woman in [her] position would appreciate the danger in advocating that carbon monoxide
poisoning is a painless and effective way of committing suicide to a suicidal teen.”55 Alternatively,
the prosecution argues that her conduct was also subjectively wanton or reckless because under

49

See id. at 20.
See id. at 21–22.
51
See Michael Miller, Michelle Carter Can Face Manslaughter Charge for Allegedly Encouraging Boyfriend’s
Suicide, Judge Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/09/24/michelle-carter-can-face-manslaughter-charge-for-allegedly-encouraging-boyfriends-suicidejudge-rules/.
52
See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §
13 (West 2015).
53
See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. 2010). For purposes of
manslaughter, “wanton” and “reckless” conduct are considered synonymous. See e.g., id. (“Wanton or reckless
conduct generally involves a wilful [sic] act that is undertaken in disregard of the probable harm to others that may
result.”); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944) (“The words ‘wanton’ and ‘reckless’ are
practically synonymous in this connection, although the word ‘wanton’ may contain a suggestion of arrogance or
insolence or heartlessness that is lacking in the word ‘reckless.’ But intentional conduct to which either word applies
is followed by the same legal consequences as though both words applied.”).
54
A defendant can be found guilty of manslaughter if his or her conduct was either objectively or subjectively
reckless. See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am. Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 (Mass. 2010); see also
discussion at infra II.C.
55
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 27.
50
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Michelle’s own admission, she knew that Conrad was susceptible to suicidal thoughts, and she had
advance knowledge of his plan to commit suicide on July 12.56 The State alleges that Michelle
caused Conrad’s death by enabling him to produce carbon monoxide,57 as well as by telling him to
“get back in” when he had second thoughts.58
Alternatively, omission or failure to act when the defendant had a duty to act can also
constitute wanton or reckless conduct for purposes of manslaughter prosecution.59 A defendant
has a duty to act if (1) he or she has a special relationship to the victim or (2) he or she created a
life-threatening condition.60 The State relied on the latter theory, arguing that Carter created a lifethreatening condition for a suicidal Conrad by directing Conrad to obtain a generator and
pressuring him to commit suicide.61 Because she created the life-threatening condition, Michelle
had to a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk of him carrying out the plan.62 Michelle
could have alleviated the possible harm to Conrad by either preventing his suicide or alerting his
family of his plans, but she failed to do so.63

C. Defendant’s Argument64

56

See id. at 27.
See id. at 32.
58
See id. at 30.
59
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910–11 (Mass. 1995).
60
See Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang, 25 N.E.3d 315, 328 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (“Duty may be established
in one of two ways. The first is where the defendant has a special relationship to the victim. . . . The second is
where the defendant ‘creates a situation that poses a grave risk of death or serious injury to another.’”).
61
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 30.
62
See id. at 29.
63
See id. at 29–30.
64
This Comment will not address Defendant’s arguments that the Massachusetts Manslaughter Statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case and that Michelle Carter is not a “youthful offender.” See
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 17–18, 15–17, Commonwealth v. Carter, No.
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) (hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum).
57
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In response to these allegations, Michelle argues that there is not enough evidence to
sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter because she was not wanton or reckless. First,
Michelle argues that did not commit an affirmative act that constituted wanton or reckless conduct
because there is no evidence that “a physical act of force, pressure, violence, or any direct touching
by the defendant whatsoever led to this manner of death.”65 For this argument, the defense cites
Massachusetts case law that requires a “physical act” that caused the victim’s death for
manslaughter which is not based on an omission.66 She did not provide the physical means for
Conrad to commit suicide, and she was not physically present at the time that he committed the
act.67
Second, Michelle contends she cannot be charged under the alternative theory of wanton
or reckless conduct by omission. First, Michelle and Conrad did not have a “special relationship”
recognized by law that would give rise to a duty to prevent Conrad from committing suicide.68
Michelle also argued that she did not “create” the risk of death for Conrad because he had
contemplated suicide before meeting Michelle, and therefore his suicidal condition was not caused
by Michelle.69 Lastly, the defendant argued that her actions are protected by the First Amendment
and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’s protections on free speech. 70 Based on these
arguments, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the charges against her.71 On September 23, 2015,

Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 4.
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Mass. 1995) (“Usually wanton or reckless conduct consists
of an affirmative act, like driving an automobile or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable harmful
consequences to another.”); see also Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass.
2010) (intentional act requirement); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 687 (Mass. 2012) (physical act
requirement).
67
See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 14.
68
See id. at 5.
69
See id. at 9–10.
70
See id. at 17–18 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014)).
71
See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
65
66
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Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders rejected the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case would
proceed.72
III. Punishing Suicide and Related Offenses
Courts have varied in their treatment of encouraging suicide over time, with recent cases
tending to more lenient punishment. This section will examine the history of punishment for
assisting suicide. First, it will discuss the way the common law treated suicide and assisting
suicide, both in England and the early history of the United States. Next, it will discuss cases that
punished suicide assistance or encouragement as murder. Lastly, it will discuss courts’s more
recent tendency of treating assisting or encouraging suicide as manslaughter.
A. Common Law
Common law treated suicide as murder and a felony.73 Under the common law of England,
it was a “crime against the laws of God and man.”74 However, by the very nature of the crime, the
felon was out of the reach of the law, which created a difficulty in designing a punishment. 75 As
punishment, the “goods and chattels of the criminal were forfeited to the [k]ing, his body had an
ignominious burial in the highway, and he was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de
se.”76 Because all of the deceased’s property was surrendered to the king, the felon’s family and
heirs were left to suffer the consequences of the suicide.
The colonies declined to follow the English common law by requiring forfeiture. For
example, the common law of Massachusetts never required forfeiture of property after suicide.77

72

See id.
See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987).
74
See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877).
75
See id. at 423 (“It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished by any proceeding of the courts, for the
reason that the person who kills himself has placed himself beyond the reach of justice, and nothing can be done.
But the law, nevertheless, recognizes suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also criminal.”).
76
Id. at 425. In 1870, England abolished the practice of forfeiture and finally abolished suicide as a crime in 1961.
See David S. Markson, Comment, Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969).
77
See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426.
73
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Nevertheless, suicide was still considered malum in se and a felony under Massachusetts common
law.78 An act is malum in se if it is “inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.”79 Lacking
the ability to punish the felon, the Massachusetts legislature passed a statute in 1660 denying “the
privilege of being buried in the common burying-place of Christians” to those who committed
suicide and instead required that they be buried on a common highway with a cartload of stones
over the grave.80 Massachusetts was the only state to adopt the English practice of ignominious
burial.81 The dishonorable burial was intended to serve as a “brand of infamy, and as a warning to
others to beware of the like damnable practices.” 82 This law remained in place into the
establishment of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.83
Massachusetts was not the only state to reject the harsh punishment of suicide at English
common law. For example, Michigan omitted suicide from its criminal law altogether.84 Some
states included provisions in their constitutions prohibiting forfeiture of property as punishment in
general. 85 West Virginia went a step further in 1923 and enacted a statute that specifically
prohibited forfeiture of a person’s estate as punishment suicide.86 Faced with an inability to punish
the crime, many states decided not to treat suicide as a crime at all when they moved away from

78

See id.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (10th ed. 2014). See also William L. Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism:
Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 648 (1999) (“‘[M]alum
in se,’ . . . means wrong in and of itself.”).
80
See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 426 (1877).
81
See Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, Note, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1986)
(citing
G. Williams, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1957)).
82
Mink, 123 Mass. at 426.
83
See id.
84
See Donald Wright, Comment, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 157
(1975).
85
See id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
86
See W. VA. CODE § 61-11-4 (2015) (“No suicide or attainder of felony shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture
of estate.”).
79
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the common law and shifted toward statutory crimes.87 Other states retained the common law
crime of suicide in order to allow them to punish suicide attempts.88
It is less clear whether assisting suicide was a crime at common law. According to some
sources, aiding, advising, or abetting a suicide was murder, just as committing suicide was
murder.89 The aider and abettor was treated as “a principal in the second degree to the self-murder
of the other.”90 Other sources suggest the common law punished assisting suicide under a theory
of accomplice liability.91 As a result, the accomplice was treated differently depending on whether
or not he or she was present at the time of the suicide. If the aider and abettor was present at the
time of the act, he or she was considered a principle to the crime of suicide.92 On the other hand,
those who encouraged suicide but were not present at the time of the suicide would escape
punishment because conviction of an accessory required the conviction of the principal of the
crime.93 However, this treatment was premised on the idea that suicide was a crime, to which the
defendant could be a party, which was not always the case.94
B. Encouraging Suicide as Murder
Early decisions by Massachusetts courts treated assisting suicide as murder. In the 1816
case of Commonwealth v. Bowen, a Massachusetts court convicted the defendant for murder after
he encouraged a fellow inmate to commit suicide.95 Bowen’s cell was adjacent to another prisoner,

87

See Wright, supra note 84, at 157.
See id.
89
See, e.g., State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987); In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983).
90
Id.
91
See Wright, supra note 84, at 161.
92
See Wright, supra note 84, at 161.
93
See Markson, supra note 76, at 473.
94
See Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (holding that the defendant could not be an
accomplice to suicide because suicide was not a crime in the state), overruled by Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1925).
95
See 13 Mass. 356 (1816). The facts of this case are largely laid out in a later Massachusetts case, Commonwealth
v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877).
88
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which allowed the men to converse freely with one another.96 Bowen was accused of encouraging
the other prisoner to commit suicide in order to deprive the sheriff and the townspeople of the
opportunity to see him executed. 97 The night before the other prisoner was scheduled for
execution, he took Bowen’s advice and hung himself in his cell. 98 Bowen was charged with
murder, and the court found that “where one counseled [sic] another to commit suicide, who by
reason of his advice, and in his presence, did so, the adviser was guilty of murder.”99
In 1877, The Massachusetts Supreme Court revisited this application of the murder statute
in Commonwealth v. Mink, which involved a woman who was charged with murder after
accidentally killing her fiancé during an attempt to kill herself.100 Defendant-Mink threatened to
kill herself when her fiancé threatened to leave her.101 He tried to prevent her from committing
suicide, and in the ensuing struggle, she shot and killed him.102 Though the court proceeded under
a theory of felony murder, it discussed in detail and affirmed the holding in Bowen, stating that “if
a man murders himself, and one stands by, aiding in and abetting the death, he is as guilty as if he
had conducted himself in the same manner where A[] murders B. And if one becomes the
procuring cause of death, though absent, he is accessory.”103
This approach to suicide is not unique to Massachusetts. In its 1872 decision, Blackburn
v. State,104 an Ohio court heard a case where the defendant administered poison to a woman, who
eventually died as a result.105 Evidence showed that the defendant and the decedent had agreed to

96

See id.
See id.
98
See id.
99
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877).
100
See 123 Mass. 422 (1877).
101
See Mink, 123 Mass. at 422–23.
102
See id. at 423.
103
See id. at 428.
104
23 Ohio St. 146 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
105
See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 147 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d
293 (1969).
97
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commit suicide together.106 Evidence also showed, however, that the defendant, “by threats of
violence or otherwise, forced [the woman] to swallow the poison, or forced it down her throat.”107
The defendant argued that Ohio does not have a law prohibiting suicide, and therefore, he could
“not be a criminal accessory, nor a criminal principal in the second degree, to an act which is not
itself a crime.”108 The court found it immaterial whether the victim took the poison by choice or if
she succumbed to pressure from the defendant.109 Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
the defendant was not being prosecuted for assisting in suicide but for administering poison to
another person, which is murder regardless of the other person’s wishes or condition.110 Similarly,
in its 1920 decision, People v. Roberts, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a man committed
murder when he mixed poison for his wife with multiple sclerosis and left it at her bedside,
especially since her condition would not have allowed her to obtain the poison without his help.111
However, in 1983, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that Roberts no longer
represented the law of Michigan. In People v. Campbell, the court held that encouraging suicide
and even providing the murder weapon could not be murder because murder was the unlawful
killing of another.112 Campbell was drinking with another man who became depressed and suicidal
during the course of their drinking together.113 Campbell encouraged the man to buy a gun, and
when he refused, Campbell went to his house to get his own gun.114 Campbell left his gun with the
other man, who used it to kill himself.115 Michigan’s murder statute did not include a definition

106

See id. at 148–49.
See id. at148.
108
Id. at 153.
109
See id. at 162–63.
110
See d. at163–64.
111
See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920).
112
See 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
113
See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
114
See id.
115
See id. at 29.
107

15

Carla Zavala Comment
for homicide, so the courts derived its definition from the common law, which defined a homicide
as the killing of one human being by another. 116 Since the man killed himself, there was no
homicide to which Campbell could have been a party. 117 Furthermore, in order to find the
defendant guilty, the court required that he want to kill the man himself, not only that he want the
man to die.118 As a final consideration, the court noted that there had been a trend towards charging
assistance or aiding in a suicide as manslaughter, but not murder, which the court interpreted as a
reflection of the “moral values of the present day.”119
C. Encouraging Suicide as Manslaughter
Consistent with the observation of the Michigan court in Campbell, more recent cases have
been less harsh than the courts in Bowen and Blackburn, charging those who encourage or assist
suicide with manslaughter, instead of murder. For example, Massachusetts backed away from its
harsh treatment of encouraging suicide in Bowen and shifted towards treating it as manslaughter.
Massachusetts’s statute prohibiting manslaughter does not define the term “manslaughter.” 120
Instead, manslaughter derives its elements from its common law definition.121 The common law
defined involuntary manslaughter as “an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the
commission of an unlawful act, malum in se, [] not amounting to a felony nor likely to endanger
life . . . or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to
another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.”122 Wanton or reckless conduct is “intentional
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conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct
involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.” 123 Therefore,
conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires finding that (1) the defendant intended to commit
an act, (2) the act the defendant intended to commit was wanton or reckless, and (3) the act caused
the victim’s death.124
Conduct satisfies the wanton or reckless requirement if it is either objectively or
subjectively wanton or reckless. 125 Conduct is objectively wanton or reckless “if an ordinary
normal [person] under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.”126
For a finding of subjective wanton or recklessness, the “grave danger to others must have been
apparent and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct
so as to avoid the act or omission [that] caused the harm.”127 Lastly, the intentional, wanton or
reckless conduct must be the cause of the death that occurs. Courts have defined “cause” as
conduct which “in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the
death would not have occurred.”128
A typical manslaughter case is based on affirmative conduct that causes the death of a
victim. Two separate Massachusetts cases are instructive here. In Commonwealth v. McCauley,
the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed one of his
friends.129 The court found that the evidence that McCauley was not familiar with guns, had no
intent to kill the victim, and did not know the gun was loaded was sufficient to warrant a jury
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instruction for manslaughter. 130 In Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, a more recent case, the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals charged the defendant with involuntary manslaughter for shooting
his friend in the chest.131 Like in McCauley, the court found the evidence that the defendant “did
not know whether the gun was fully loaded” and his testimony that he had never fired the gun
before sufficient to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter.132
Encouraging suicide does not fit as neatly into the definition of manslaughter because there
is usually an intervening act by the victim, which causes death. Still, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court has previously upheld a charge of involuntary manslaughter to an alleged assisted suicide.133
In Persampieri v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after
his wife committed suicide.134 Persampieri had allegedly loaded the gun for his wife at her request
and made suggestions that would make it easier for her to discharge the gun.135 He also taunted
her for being “too chicken” to kill herself, as she had attempted suicide twice before, but failed
both times.136 The court held that involuntary manslaughter was an appropriate charge because the
defendant aided his wife’s self-murder by being present in the room during the suicide,
encouraging his wife to kill herself, and taunting her with accusations of being too scared to do
it.137
Courts in other states have similarly held that a defendant is guilty of manslaughter if he
or she provides the physical means of suicide while encouraging the victim to carry out a suicide
plan. The Iowa Supreme Court took this approach in State v. Marti.138 In this 1980 case, the court
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held that loading a gun for a suicidal person and encouraging him or her to commit suicide is
criminal because “it constitutes murder or manslaughter, not because it coincidentally helped
someone to die who wanted to die anyway.”139 In 1992, an appellate court in New York affirmed
a manslaughter conviction where the defendant goaded the victim to kill himself, knowing that the
victim was drunk and depressed.140 According to the court, the defendant acted recklessly because
he knew there was a substantial risk that the victim would heed his advice and kill himself, due to
his depression and intoxication.141
IV. Categories of Encouraging Suicide
Part of the reason that punishing actions like Michelle’s and other similar cases is so
difficult is the lack of clear, legally significant categories of offenses. Cases involving assisting
or encouraging suicide fall mainly into three broad categories, with varying degrees of
involvement on behalf of both the defendant and the victim. Each category is defined by the causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the other person’s suicide, which is also known
as the “causation” element of the offense.142 A defendant’s act satisfies the causation element of a
criminal offense if it is both the actual cause and the proximate cause of the prohibited result.143 In
this case, the prohibited result is the suicide of the other person. First, the defendant’s act is the
actual cause of a suicide if it is a cause without which the result, in this case the suicide, would not
have occurred when it did.144 Second, the defendant’s act is the proximate cause of the suicide if
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it produced the death in a natural and continuous sequence of events. 145 This section will divide
the cases into three categories based on whether the defendant’s actions satisfied these types of
causation for the suicide of another person.
A. Defendant Kills Victim Who Wanted to Die
The first category of cases involves those defendants who physically kill the victim.
Typically, the defendant will be charged with murder, regardless of the fact that the victim might
have wanted to die anyway. In this category, the defendant is both the proximate cause and the
but-for cause of the other person’s death. In People v. Matlock,146 the defendant claimed that the
man he had robbed and murdered had requested that he do so. According to Matlock, the victim
wanted to die so that his family could collect his life insurance policy, but the policy did not cover
suicide, so he enlisted the defendant’s help.147 In evaluating the defendant’s appeal, the court noted
that the defendant had clearly committed murder, regardless of whether his allegations about the
victim’s wishes were true.148 In a similar 1981 case, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that murder
was an appropriate charge where the defendant had administered a lethal dose of cocaine at the
victim’s request and later shot the victim in the head when the cocaine failed to bring about the
victim’s death.149
These cases fall easily into the category of murder or voluntary manslaughter, even if they
are not typical murders. Although the victim allegedly wanted to die, their death was still at the
hands of the defendants. In both of these cases, the defendants, not the victims, were the physical
actors. This fact pattern is in-line with both the legal and the layperson’s concepts of murder.
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Even Mink can be put in this category, because, there, the defendant killed her fiancé by
accidentally shooting him; the fact that the fatal shooting happened during her own suicide attempt
is an irrelevant circumstance. 150 These cases fall easily into existing categories of murder or
manslaughter.
B. Defendant Provides Instrument Used in Suicide
Another category of cases involves defendants who provide a suicidal individual with the
weapon or means to commit suicide, with knowledge that the person wanted to commit suicide.
In this category, the defendant is the actual cause—but not the proximate cause—of the person’s
suicide. The defendant gives the individual the means to commit suicide, but the other person’s
act produces the suicide. If the act of the other was free, deliberate, and informed, the intervening
act is a superseding cause of the suicide.151 Cases that fall in this category include providing a
suicidal individual with a gun;152 loading the gun for a suicidal individual;153 and providing poison
to someone who is suicidal.154 Cases like these have received more varied treatment from courts,
ranging from murder convictions155 to findings of no liability at all.156
Courts struggle with these cases because the “victim” commits the act that directly causes
his or her own death, like taking the poison or shooting themselves with the loaded gun. 157
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However, the defendant provided the instrument used for the murder, and in some cases, the victim
would not have been able to obtain the instrument without the defendant’s action. 158 The
defendant’s acts are blameworthy, but would not have led to a death without the victim’s
intervening action.
C. Defendant Verbally Encourages Suicide
A third category of cases involves defendants who do not commit physical actions that lead
to the victim’s death. Instead, the defendants verbally encourage the victim to commit suicide.
Arguably, the defendants in this category of cases are neither the actual cause nor the proximate
cause of the suicide. Not only does the other person’s free, deliberate, and informed act of
committing suicide break the causal connection,159 but also, the defendant’s act was not an actual
cause of the suicide. The defendant neither kills the other person nor provides the means for
suicide. The defendant is not even physically with the other individual when he or she commits
suicide.160 The victim could have committed suicide without the defendant’s intervention.
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant did not commit a physical act to help another
person commit suicide. 161 Melchert-Dinkel posed as a suicidal nurse on message boards that
provided emotional support for people who were also suicidal.162 Two of the people with whom
Melchert-Dinkel had contact eventually committed suicide. 163 The individuals who committed
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suicide lived in England and Canada, while Melchert-Dinkel was in Minnesota. 164 Similarly,
Michelle was thirty miles away when Conrad committed suicide.165 She did not physically plug
the power into the generator that caused his death; she did not provide him with the generator. She
was at her home, talking to Conrad from a remote location.166
Because these defendants were not the actual nor proximate causes, their cases are much
more difficult to fit into traditional concepts of murder or manslaughter. Nevertheless, the
defendants did contribute, if slightly, to the suicide. Even Michelle knew that she could potentially
face consequences for her encouragement, though she likely could not imagine she would face
charges of manslaughter.167 In some ways, this kind of encouragement seems more culpable than
someone who physically helps a terminally-ill loved one commit suicide, although the latter would
fall into the category of providing physical means for suicide.168 Even so, defendants who verbally
encourage another’s suicide are distinguishable from usual murder cases or accidental shootings,
which are more typical manslaughters.
V. A Statutory Solution
Instead of punishing encouragement169 or physical assistance of suicide under a theory of
murder or manslaughter, states could proscribe this conduct with a statute that would specifically
prohibit the assistance of suicide.

This section will recommend a statute under which

encouragement and assistance to suicide can be prosecuted without resorting to manslaughter or
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murder statutes. Then, it will compare how prosecution under the proposed theory compares to
the current approach in achieving the societal goals that punishment is supposed to serve.
A. The Statute
In People v. Campbell, when deciding a charge of murder for assisting suicide, the
Michigan Supreme Court noted that the decision of whether to criminalize incitement to suicide
belongs to the legislature.170 The Model Penal Code treats “causing” a suicide as criminal homicide
“only if [the defendant] purposely causes such suicide by force, duress or deception.”171 A separate
provision makes it a crime to “aid or solicit” suicide.172 An example of “causing” suicide would
be a defendant who brutally beats a victim, threatening that if she does not jump out of an eleventh
floor window to her death, he will personally beat her to death.173 Though the defendant did not
physically throw the victim out of the window, the victim committed suicide under duress. This
kind of duress or coercion is different from a case where a defendant provides a gun or verbal
encouragement to an individual who was already suicidal before the defendant intervened.
Verbal encouragement and physical assistance would fall into the category of “aiding or
soliciting” suicide, which is a second degree felony and an offense separate from homicide, under
the Model Penal Code’s formulation.174 The maximum sentence for second degree felonies in the
Model Penal Code’s tentative sentencing guidelines is twenty years imprisonment, which was
increased from ten years imprisonment in the original draft.175 Some states have enacted specific
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statutes that criminalize assisting or aiding suicide, but punish the offense at or about the same
level as manslaughter.176 A specific statute should include provisions for lesser punishment, to
accommodate the diminished culpability of the defendant, in light of the victim’s own intervening
acts that caused his or her death.
A specific statute should also provide a definition for what kind of assistance would rise to
the level of “aid” to a suicide. One suggestion would be to expand the Model Penal Code provision
to distinguish between the different types of assistance. Thus, under such a statute, a defendant is
guilty of assistance to suicide if he or she: (1) “intentionally provides the means by which suicide
is attempted or committed” or (2) intentionally acts as a suicide participant.177 A suicide participant
is a person, other than the victim, who “actively, affirmatively participates in the act of suicide.”178
In other words, liability for assisting suicide would be limited to those who are both the actual and
proximate cause of the victim’s suicide. Alternatively, the state could choose to limit liability to
those who physically participate in the suicide. 179 If a state legislature wants the statute’s
prohibition to reach conduct that is merely verbal encouragement, they can include a prohibition
for causing or soliciting a suicide by means of duress. If the victim acted under duress, their
intervening act would not be the kind of free, deliberate, and informed act that breaks the causal
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chain between the defendant’s act and the ensuing suicide. The fact-finder at trial would then
determine whether the defendant’s actions rose to the level of duress.
B. Evaluating the Alternatives
Society punishes criminals in order to achieve certain goals. Criminal punishment seeks
to attain four goals: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. 180 An adequate
criminal punishment should achieve one or more of these goals.181 This section will discuss each
goal of punishment. Then, it will analyze and compare how each alternative for punishing
encouraging suicide, manslaughter and a specific statute, achieves the goal of punishment.
i. Deterrence
One goal of criminal punishment is deterrence. There are two kinds of deterrence: specific
deterrence and general deterrence. According to the theory of specific deterrence, criminal
punishment aims to deter the criminal himself (rather than to deter others) from committing further
crimes, by giving him an unpleasant experience he will not want to endure again.182 This theory
of punishment requires the deterrence of the particular defendant. Under this view, Michelle Carter
should be prosecuted so that she will not commit this crime again. However, there is no evidence
that Michelle made Conrad suicidal or sought him out for that reason. To the contrary, Conrad
was suicidal and was treated for depression and mental illness before he even met Michelle. 183
There is also evidence that Michelle regretted not doing more to prevent Conrad from killing
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himself.184 A statutory prohibition would allow for Michelle to be punished, while allowing more
lenient penalties that would better fit the crime she committed. Restraint185 and rehabilitation,186
discussed further below, are often considered types of specific deterrence.187
General deterrence argues for the punishment of offenders as a way of sending a message
to other people who might consider engaging in the same conduct in the future. According to this
theory, other people will see the harsh punishment imposed upon the offender and will not want
to suffer the same fate, so they will not engage in the behavior.188 In the case of encouraging or
aiding suicide, criminal prosecution seeks to deter people from encouraging another’s suicide to
advance their own personal motives, like pursuing an inheritance or ridding themselves of a
burdensome dependent.189
There is evidence that general deterrence is mildly effective for malum prohibitum 190
offenses, but not for other kinds of crime.191 Three requirements must be met in order for this kind
of deterrence to be effective.192 First, the potential offender must know of the law prohibiting the
conduct.193 Second, the offender must perceive the cost of violating the law as greater than any
benefit he or she will derive from committing the crime. 194 Lastly, the potential offender must be
able and willing to allow this knowledge to influence his or her actions.195 Under this analysis, it
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is unlikely that charging Michelle with manslaughter will deter others from engaging in the same
behavior.
First, the public is probably unaware that some jurisdictions punish encouraging suicide,
in any form, as murder or manslaughter. Michelle’s case has been widely reported and has brought
attention to the possibility of being charged with involuntary manslaughter for encouraging
suicide.

Prior to her case, however, the average person was likely unaware that verbal

encouragement—or even incitement—of suicide could be manslaughter. As time passes and
Michelle’s case fades from the public eye, the general population will again forget, and any
potential deterrent effect will be lost.

A specific statute that proscribes certain kinds of

encouragement and assistance of suicide would leave no doubt in the mind of both law
enforcement and citizens that such acts are prohibited. A clear, straightforward prohibition on
encouragement or assistance to suicide would at least increase the likelihood that a potential
offender can understand the law.196
Second, effective general deterrence requires the offender to perceive the cost of
punishment to be greater than any benefit from the violation. Even those who are aware of the
possibility of being charged with manslaughter for encouraging another’s suicide might still
believe that they are unlikely to be caught or prosecuted. This will influence their balancing of the
costs and benefits of committing the prohibited act. For example, Michelle asked Conrad to delete
their text message conversations before committing suicide so that she would not be associated
with his death.197 Furthermore, prosecution for encouraging suicide is sporadic and often leads to

See id. at 989 (“[T]here are ways in which knowledge of [a criminal law rule] can be increased. . . . [A] bare
prohibition itself is the easiest rule to convey.”).
197
See Phillip, supra note 11.
196

28

Carla Zavala Comment
wildly inconsistent outcomes.198 This is certainly true in Michelle’s case; the last reported case of
a charge of manslaughter for encouraging suicide in Massachusetts was Persampieri v.
Commonwealth in 1961.199 Delay between the commission of the act and the eventual punishment
may also distort any cost-benefit analysis a potential offender might undertake, making benefits
seem much greater than any costs which he or she believes to be far off. 200 Michelle’s case has
been significantly delayed by motions and arguments about whether or not her actions fit the
definition of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts precedent.201 If Massachusetts passed
the proposed statute that specifically prohibited encouraging suicide, such issues would be easier
to decide because the statute would define the offense. As jurisprudence develops, appellate courts
would resolve ambiguities that remain in the application of the statute.
The final prerequisite for deterrence to be effective requires that the offender use the
calculation of costs against benefits to influence his or her decisions. It is likely that offenders do
not consider the legal implications of their acts at all. For example, use of drugs and alcohol often
impairs an offender’s judgment.202 Critics of the theory of both general and specific deterrence
argue that the idea of a criminal rational actor is an oxymoron. 203 This is especially true in

198

See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 370–71 (arguing that police and prosecutorial discretion tends to make prosecution
of encouraging suicide ineffective and results in injustice whenever charges are pursued).
199
See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). Some sources reported that Bristol
County District Attorney Thomas Quinn had a relationship with Conrad’s family, and he eventually recused himself
from the case. CBS BOS., supra note 6. It is not clear whether his relationship influenced the decision to bring
charges against Michelle.
200
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954.
201
Conrad committed suicide in July 2014, and the Judge decided the Defendant’s motion to dismiss in September
2015. See Miller, supra note 51.
202
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954–56.
203
See Barnes, supra note 79, at 631; see also James Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (rev. ed. 1983)
(“[S]ome scholars contend that a large fraction of crime is committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or
abnormal that even if there were no delay, uncertainty, or ignorance attached to the consequences of criminality, we
would still have a lot of crime.”).

29

Carla Zavala Comment
situations rife with emotion like those involving suicide.204 Michelle probably did not consider the
costs or possible consequences of her encouragement in the weeks leading up to Conrad’s suicide.
It was not until afterwards that she seemed to consider that she could be prosecuted for her
involvement.205
ii. Restraint
Restraint, also called incapacitation, is a theory of punishment focused on removing the
criminal from society.206 According to this theory, if a defendant is imprisoned or restrained in
some way, then he or she cannot commit more crimes and possibly do more harm to society. 207
The only way to incapacitate an offender completely is to put them to death, since that will
permanently remove them from society.208 Any other form of incapacitation is by definition less
than complete. Therefore, unless the state sentenced all offenders to death or life in prison, how
well punishment achieves incapacitation is a matter of degree. Even offenders serving life in
prison without possibility of parole remain members of prison society and, in some cases, can
continue their life of crime within the prison.209 Restraint can, however, be furthered through other
means. When offenders are put in prison, they are isolated from general society for some period
of time, protecting at least some part of the population from their crimes. Electronic monitoring
systems provide an alternative to incarceration while still restraining the offender to some degree.
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210

In the case of punishing suicide encouragement, prosecution for manslaughter would carry a

longer prison term than a specific statute that would impose a lighter sentence. Therefore, if
removing Michelle from the general public were the ultimate goal, a charge of manslaughter would
better achieve it.
There is, however, no reason to believe that time in prison would protect other suicidal
individuals in society. In fact, research indicates that in these situations, the person who commits
suicide manipulates others into assisting or encouraging their suicide.211 According to this theory,
suicidal individuals often respond to stress with “helplessness, clinging, asking to be told what to
do, and wanting to be looked after, and a suicide attempt may be an effort to coerce such
support.”212 Even trained therapists can fall victim to this coercion, so it is not surprising that those
close to the individual find themselves drawn into a loved one’s plan for suicide.213 If this is true,
then restraining the person who assisted or encouraged the suicide will not actually protect other
suicidal individuals, who might manipulate another loved one to encourage or help plan their
suicide.214 This dynamic makes encouraging suicide a unique situation in which incapacitation of
the offender does not actually protect those who are at risk of becoming victims of the offense.
Neither the statutory solution nor the current approach under a theory of manslaughter truly serves
the goal of restraining the offender to prevent them from hurting society. Because incapacitation
for any length of time does not protect society, the offender should only be restrained long enough

210

Massachussets utilizes an electronic monitoring program as an alternative to incarceration and to provide an extra
level of supervision of probationers and parolees. See generally The Electronic Monitoring Program Fact Sheet
2014, MASS. PROBATION SERVICE 1, http:// www.mass.gov/courts/probation/elmofactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2016).
211
See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355 (“Suicidal persons often have ‘learned to use the anxiety that they can arouse
in others about their death in a coercive or manipulative way.’”). See also Hendin, supra note 204, at 293 (noting
that both terminally ill patients who ask to die and people who are otherwise suicidal are often motivated by a desire
to test the affection of others).
212
Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355 (internal citations omitted).
213
See id. at 355–56.
214
See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355.

31

Carla Zavala Comment
to serve the other goals of punishment; longer prison terms would not serve the goal of
incapacitation—protecting society—any more than a short prison term.
iii. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a theory of punishment that argues for providing offenders the appropriate
treatment in order to reintegrate the offender into society as law-abiding citizens.215 Unlike the
other goals of punishment, rehabilitation seeks to help the offender as well as society. The offender
benefits by being purged of their “moral sickness” and reaccepted into society, and society benefits
from another productive member.216 According to one definition of rehabilitation, the prosecution
and punishment itself is rehabilitative because it gives the offender more perfect information on
the chances of being caught committing the offense.217 A more contemporary understanding of
rehabilitation argues that punishment should help the offender reintegrate into society by
reforming the offender’s character or by medical treatment.218
The punishment of encouraging suicide, whether by specific statute or otherwise, will
achieve the first kind of rehabilitation by providing the offender with more perfect information for
forming future decisions. For example, Michelle will likely think twice before encouraging
another person to carry out a plan to commit suicide, regardless of whether she was charged with
manslaughter or under a specific statute prohibiting encouragement.219 However, a longer prison
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sentence is not likely to result in the second kind of rehabilitation: helping the offender reintegrate
into society. To the contrary, the American prison system has largely failed to achieve reformation
of prisoners.220 Incarceration itself has been found to have negative psychological effects on prison
inmates. 221 A long prison term might only serve to exacerbate Michelle’s emotional and
psychological problems, making her more likely to commit a crime in the future. Instead,
rehabilitation may justify a shortened sentence or diversion to non-incarcerative programs because
the offender is more likely to improve outside of prison.222 Conviction under a statute for assisting
or encouraging suicide would result in a shorter prison term than a conviction for manslaughter,
thus reducing the possibility that incarceration can inflict severe negative psychological effects on
Michelle and other offenders like her.
iv. Retribution
Lastly, the theory of retribution argues that offenders should be punished because “crime
inherently merits punishment.”223 Punishment for retribution gives offenders what they deserve
and prevents the punishment of those who do not deserve it. Retributive punishment does not seek
to achieve social benefits, but instead seeks to inflict harm on someone who deserves it.224 Thus,

because prosecution for encouraging or assisting suicide is sporadic and inconsistent, there is no data regarding rates
of recidivism.
220
See Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 191 (2010) (documenting the failure of rehabilitative programs in American corrections
because “program-oriented officials typically lacked funding and personnel commensurate to the task at hand”).
221
See id. at 194 (“Rather than focusing exclusively on the presumed pathology of prisoners to account for postprison problems and possible recidivism, [in their book C-Unit: Search for Community in Prison, Studt, Messinger,
and Wilson’s analysis] placed part of the blame on the nature of institutions in which [the prisoners] had been kept.
It was one sign among many of a growing recognition that powerful and potentially destructive forces at work in
prison, even within the very programs that were designed to help produce positive change in the name of
rehabilitation.”) (discussing ELLIOT STUDT, ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 3 (1968)).
222
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of
Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2000).
223
See id. at 1315. Retribution in this sense is also called “social retribution,” as opposed to “individual-oriented
vengeance” which refers to the satisfaction that individuals feel when a criminal is punished. See Paul Boudreaux,
Criminal Law: Booth v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 177, 184 (1989).
224
See Cotton, supra note 223, at 1315–16.

33

Carla Zavala Comment
retributive theory calls for punishment even when no social benefit will result, a fact that sets it
apart from the other utilitarian theories of punishment. 225 Though sometimes considered the
original purpose of punishment, 226 recent scholarship has recast retributivism as a method of
limiting punishment, giving offenders only as much punishment as they deserve.227 This gives rise
to the difficulty with assigning desert: how does retributivist theory decide who deserves to be
punished and how much punishment the offender deserves? 228 Under one theory, protective
retributivism, punishment would look to the harms society suffered as a result of the offender’s
action. 229 Under another theory, victim vindication, the degree of punishment the offender
deserves is that which would “even the score” between the offender and the victim of his or her
crime.230
Encouraging suicide is considered a threat to the “interests in the sanctity of life that are
represented by the criminal homicide laws . . . even though the act may be accomplished with the
consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim.”231 In Michelle’s case, many people might find
what Michelle did morally repugnant—something even her lawyer, Joseph Cataldo,
acknowledges.232 Some have called her actions “horrendous,” and others have commented that
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“there should be some way that society punishes this behavior.”233 Similarly, the Michigan Court
of Appeals called encouraging suicide “morally reprehensible” but ultimately not a crime, because
there was no statute in Michigan prohibiting it.234 Punishing encouragement of suicide under a
specific statute would punish the offender, serving society’s need for retribution. At the same
time, it would also serve the limiting principle of modern retributivism, by allowing for a shorter
sentence. A shorter sentence is more proportionate to the crime of the person who encouraged a
suicide. Under the protectionist view of retribution, offenders should be punished in proportion to
their crime. Michelle’s actions, while reprehensible, do not rise to the level of culpability of an
accidental shooting235 or providing a gun to someone intent on committing suicide.236 Choosing
between manslaughter and a specific statute, the victim vindication theory of retributivism would
also require the less severe of the two. The evidence that the “victims” of encouraged suicide often
manipulate their loved ones into helping them tends to show that there is much less of a score to
“even” in the case of this specific crime.237
VI. Conclusion
When the news spread that Bristol County Massachusetts was charging Michelle Carter
with manslaughter for encouraging her boyfriend to commit suicide, some questioned whether her
actions actually constituted manslaughter. 238 Her actions did not fit the public’s preconceived
notion of what manslaughter is. Her case seemed to be an anomaly, prompting widespread media
attention. However, a close look at both at English common law and cases in various states proves
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that her case is not the first of its kind. Because Massachusetts law allows prosecutors to treat any
and all encouragement or assistance of suicide under a theory of manslaughter, there have been
inconsistent outcomes that do little to advance the goals of punishment. As the above analysis
indicates, a specific statute that prohibits encouragement and assistance of suicide will better serve
the goals of punishment and is preferable to the current approach. A statutory solution will allow
the legislature within each state to clarify this area of law; otherwise, prosecutors will continue to
make due with an unclear legal landscape and an antiquated punishment for an act that has become
more nuanced due to modern technology.
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